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Abstract 
With the beginning of the new millennium it has become more and more apparent that 
education and human capital constitute a key element of modern economies. Despite the 
important role of human capital in modern societies, there are still many unknowns about 
the process of educational production as well as individual and collective decisions 
concerning how much and what kind of education to obtain. This literature review aims at 
providing a better understanding of the process of human capital formation and educational 
attainment. Although human capital plays an important role in both microeconomics and 
macroeconomics, we focus on the former branch of literature in order to analyze the 
individual incentives to acquire skills. 
This review is divided into six parts each of them representing an important stream of 
human capital literature. First, we introduce the basic concept of human capital that models 
individuals as investing in skills in response to the expected returns to education. After this, 
we investigate the different implications of investments in general and specific human capital 
and then provide an overview of various empirical studies measuring the rate of return to 
education. Because educational attainment may also be affected by other factors such as 
school characteristics or family background, we review the literature on educational 
production functions and discuss the significance of potential inputs into the process of 
educational production. Subsequently, we refer to models of human capital accumulation 
over the life-cycle that manage to replicate the empirical life-cycle patterns with respect to 
the age-earnings profile of individuals. Finally, we analyze the effects of taxation and 
education subsidies on the formation of human capital. 
Keywords 
Human Capital, Return to Education, Education Production Function, Life-Cycle of Earnings, 
Education Subsidies 
JEL Classification 
H24, H52, I20, I21, I28, J24, J31, J41 1 Introduction
With the beginning of the new millennium it has become more and more apparent that education and
human capital constitute a key element of modern economies. While some developing countries succeed
in attracting industries of the so-called old economy, developed economies have to concentrate on skill
intensive industries in order to defend their leading position. In this context, the change to an information
society is occurring rapidly, with information and knowledge the crucial inputs and outputs of nearly
all economic processes. Despite the important role of human capital in modern societies, there are still
many unknowns about the process of educational production as well as individual and collective decisions
concerning how much and what kind of education to obtain.
The contribution of this literature review is to provide a better understanding of the process of
human capital formation and educational attainment. Furthermore, we analyze policy instruments and
institutional features that may help to increase the aggregate welfare by improving the eﬃciency of the
educational system. In order to structure the vast literature on human capital formation, the paper is
divided into six parts. As an introduction to human capital theory, Section 2 introduces the basic concept
of human capital that models individuals as investing in skills in response to the expected returns to
education.
In Section 3, we distinguish between general and speciﬁc human capital and analyze the diﬀerent
implications for human capital investments by workers and ﬁrms. In perfect labor markets, all costs and
beneﬁts of general training are borne by the workers, while ﬁrms and workers share both the costs and the
returns of investments in speciﬁc training (Becker (1964)). In imperfect labor markets, general training
may also be ﬁrm-sponsored because the wage structure is compressed, which implies that ﬁrms manage
to skim labor market rents depending on the amount of training (Acemoglu and Pischke (1998a)).
Section 4 of this review refers to the return to education from the individual’s point of view according
to Mincer (1974). Although the rate of return to education varies signiﬁcantly in response to various
inﬂuencing factors, the average estimate for developed economies generally ranges from 5% to 10% (Wil-
son (2001)). In Section 5, we review the literature on educational production functions and discuss the
signiﬁcance of potential inputs into the process of educational production. While the empirical evidence
concerning the impact of school resources is mixed, there is an unambiguous eﬀect of family and peer
groups as well as institutional incentives within the educational system (Hanushek (1997)). Section 6
describes the life-cycle of earnings with endogenous formation of human capital. The two most impor-
tant approaches by Ben-Porath (1967) and Heckman (1976) manage to replicate the empirical life-cycle
patterns with respect to the age-earnings proﬁle of individuals.
Finally, in Section 7, we analyze the eﬀects of taxation and education subsidies on the accumulation
of human capital. The marginal eﬀects of proportional and progressive income taxation on human capital
formation are generally negative (Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1999a)). Depending on whether the
costs of human capital are direct expenditures or foregone earnings, a "comprehensive income tax" may
discriminate either against investments in human or in physical capital. In a nutshell, the incentives for
human capital formation depend on the net eﬀective tax rate, which implies that education subsidies
3can increase eﬃciency by oﬀsetting tax-induced distortions (Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005)). Section 8
concludes.
2 The Concept of Human Capital
"Human capital" can be deﬁned as knowledge, skills, attitudes, aptitudes, and other acquired traits con-
tributing to production (Goode (1959)). Skills represent individual capacities contributing to production
as an argument in the production function (Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne (2001)). According to Blun-
dell, Dearden, Meghir, and Sianesi (1999), there are two main components of human capital with strong
complementarity: early ability (whether acquired or innate) and skills acquired through formal education
or training on the job. Human capital diﬀers from other assets because it yields market returns only in
proportion to the worker’s supply of labor (Hall and Johnson (1980)). Ishikawa and Ryan (2002) suggest
that it is the stock of human capital that predominantly determines the earnings of individuals. An
extensive review of the theory of human capital is given by Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004).
The ﬁrst use of the term "human capital" in modern economic literature was by Schultz (1961). He
classiﬁes expenditures on human capital as investment rather than consumption.1 In the same year,
Weisbrod (1961) developed a ﬁrst conceptual framework for estimating the value of assets in the form of
human capital. Capital values of people as productive assets are incorporated into an analytical function
of sex, age, stock of human capital, etc. The present value of an individual at any given age a is deﬁned







Pat represents the probability of an individual of age a to be alive at age t and r is the discount rate.
In general, there are two methods of determining the value of human capital, namely by summing up the
costs of production (input-based) and by considering capitalized earnings (output-based) (Kiker (1966)).
The ﬁrst applications of human capital theory in economics are by Becker and Mincer of the Chicago
school. In his original approach, Becker (1964) develops a model of individual investment in human
capital. In this view, human capital is similar to "physical means of production". According to Becker
(1962), investing in human capital means "all activities that inﬂuence future real income through the
embedding of resources in people". Human capital investments are expenditures on education, training,
health, information, and labor mobility (Weisbrod (1966)).
The accumulation of human capital takes place in three ways: formal schooling (i.e. the individual
devotes his whole time to learning), on-the-job training (i.e. post-school training provided by the cur-
rent employer), and oﬀ-the-job training (i.e. post school training provided by "for-proﬁt" proprietary
1Shaﬀer (1961) citicizes the application of capital concepts to individuals for three reasons: educational expenditures
may be undertaken for other reasons than the expectation of monetary returns, impossibility to relate a certain return to
a certain investment, and undesirable basis for the evaluation of policy actions with respect to social welfare.
4institutions) (Lynch (1991)).2 These investments involve initial costs (direct tuition expenditures, fore-
gone earnings during schooling, and reduced wages during training)3 in order to gain a return on this
investment in the future (Becker (1992)). The return to education is based on two interrelated channels:
increased earnings for the worker and higher productivity for the ﬁrm as well as increased employment
probabilities (Bloch and Smith (1977)).4 In a nutshell, there are two key determinants of the return to
education: the costs of education and the employment opportunities after education (Rephann (2002)).
The key element in the model by Becker (1964) is that education is an investment of time and foregone
earnings for higher rates of return in later periods. As with investments in physical capital, a human
capital investment is only undertaken by wealth-maximizing individuals or ﬁrms if the expected return
from the investment (which is equal to the net internal rate of return) is greater than the market rate
of interest. Regarding the costs of human capital investments, Perri (2003) remarks that - if the best
alternative of an investment in specialized human capital is investing in another specialization of human
capital - then the measure of foregone earnings has to cover the complete opportunity costs of specialized
education. These opportunity costs describe what could have been earned with the best alternative
specialized education.5
According to Haley (1973), there are two streams of human capital literature. The ﬁrst analyzes
individual investments in human capital in order to estimate the internal rate of return (based on Becker
(1964)). The second stream of literature deals with the life-cycle of earnings. The individual faces a
trade-oﬀ between producing additional human capital and renting his existing stock of human capital in
the labor market (based on Ben-Porath (1967)).
3 General and Speciﬁc Human Capital
In his original model, Becker (1964) distinguishes between general and speciﬁc human capital. General
human capital is deﬁned to be not only useful with the current employer but also with other potential
employers. In contrast, speciﬁc human capital increases the productivity of the worker only in his
current job.6 Empirically, it is diﬃcult to distinguish between general and speciﬁc training. Loewenstein
and Spletzer (1999) try to overcome this problem by directly asking employers whether they assess the
provided training to be general or speciﬁc.
2Mincer (1962) notes that more than half of total expenditures on education are investments in on-the-job training.
3Parsons (1974) distinguishes these three major components of education costs.
4Bloch and Smith (1977) ﬁnd a positive correlation of human capital and labor market employment. Also Mincer (1989)
states that the probability of being unemployed decreases with the amount of education.
5Rosen (1983) suggests increasing rates of return in the utilization of human capital due to ﬁxed investment costs
independent of the degree of utilization. This induces private incentives for specialization, i.e. to use one type of human
capital as intensively as possible. Hence, each individual has a comparative advantage for a certain occupation that uses
the accumulated skill most intensively.
6Parsons (1974) notes that this ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital is analytically equivalent to transfer costs for adjusting a
worker to other ﬁrms.
53.1 General Human Capital
3.1.1 Investments in General Human Capital: Perfect Labor Markets
In competitive labor markets, where workers receive wages equal to their marginal product, ﬁrms cannot
recoup investments in general skills, which implies that they refuse to pay for general training (cf. table
1). This "hold-up" problem arises due to incomplete contracts which means that one party (i.e. the
employer) pays the costs of the investment in human capital, while another party (i.e. the worker) shares
in the return (Acemoglu and Shimer (1999)).
However, workers themselves have the right incentives to invest in general human capital because
they are the sole beneﬁciaries of their increased productivity (either with their current or with future
employers).7 Furthermore, workers can ﬁnance such investments quite easily by accepting a wage below
their productivity during the period of training (the wage may even be negative) (Becker (1962)). For
example, this argument can be applied to apprenticeship systems in earlier centuries, where apprentices
often paid fees or worked for very low wages until they mastered a certain grade (Hamilton (1996)).
Hence, if workers are not credit constrained, they eﬃciently invest in the accumulation of general human
capital (cf. table 1).
The empirical evidence of the model by Becker (1964) is mixed. On the one hand, it is supported by
the empirical analysis of Veum (1999). By using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY), he ﬁnds that ﬁrm-sponsored training is indeed negatively related to starting wages, but positively
related to wage growth. On the other hand, many analyses question the validity of this explanation by
showing that there are investments in general human capital which are ﬁnanced by the employer. For
example, by further analyzing data from the NLSY, Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999) ﬁnd that the larger
part of ﬁrm-sponsored training is general. Other empirical studies also show that ﬁrms bear substantial
net costs in providing general training to their apprentices. For example, Ryan (1980) examines welder
apprentices in the US and Jones (1986) analyzes apprentices in British manufacturing.
A number of studies also investigate whether workers taking part in general training programs pay for
the costs by accepting lower wages. The majority of these studies do not ﬁnd evidence of lower wages, at
least not in an appropriate amount to fully compensate ﬁrms for the costs. An overview of these results
is provided by Bishop (1997). Hence, in contradiction to the theoretical results of Becker (1964), there
is at least some empirical evidence of ﬁrm-sponsored investments in the general human capital of their
employees.
3.1.2 Investments in General Human Capital: Imperfect Labor Markets
In order to give a theoretical explanation for the empirical evidence with respect to ﬁrm-sponsored
general training, Acemoglu and Pischke (1998a) develop a model with two periods, a training period
where workers have identical productivity zero and may receive an amount of general training t at costs
7Already Eckaus (1963) criticizes that this result strictly depends on the assumption of perfect labor markets.
6Type of skill Labor markets Firms Workers Total investment
general perfect no yes eﬃcient8
general imperfect yes yes generally ineﬃcient
speciﬁc perfect yes yes generally ineﬃcient
speciﬁc imperfect yes yes generally ineﬃcient
Table 1: Investment in Human Capital
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Figure 1: Training with Compressed Wage Structure
c(t), and a second period where workers have an individual productivity f (t) and earn a wage w(t). If
the labor market is competitive and workers are not credit constrained, then the results of Becker (1964)
hold: ﬁrms do not invest in general training and workers invest eﬃciently by equating marginal returns
and marginal costs of their investment:
f′ (t∗) = c′ (t∗) (2)
However, if labor markets are not competitive or there are other labor market frictions which generate
wage compression, the worker’s wage is below his marginal product (Masters (1998)). If the wage structure
is compressed, general skills are turned into de facto speciﬁc skills and ﬁrms manage to skim labor market
rents depending on the amount of training. Formally, Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b) express this by
assuming f (t) = w(t) + △(t). Hence, the wage function increases with the level of training less steeply
than productivity (i.e. the wage structure is compressed), which implies that the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, equal
to the positive gap △(t) between productivity and wage, has a ﬁrst derivative greater than zero. As a
consequence, ﬁrms prefer more skilled workers to less skilled ones and invest in general training until the




(cf. ﬁgure 1). However, this reduction in the hold-up
problem of the ﬁrms is achieved at the expense of a second hold-up problem in the training decision of the
workers, which implies that the total amount of human capital investment is generally ineﬃcient (Roed
and Strom (2002)).
Concerning the empirical evidence, Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) ﬁnd that general training raises
7future wages more for workers who change their job than for workers who remain with the training ﬁrm.
This result is consistent with workers and employers sharing the returns to general training. Furthermore,
Brunello (2002) shows that wage compression and the amount of general training show a positive and
signiﬁcant correlation.
3.1.3 Sources of Labor Market Imperfections
There are several possible sources of labor market imperfections which generate a compressed wage struc-
ture. The ﬁrst one refers to the presence of transaction costs, for example due to matching and search
frictions. Search frictions derive from imperfect information about potential contractual partners, hetero-
geneities, the absence of perfect insurance markets, limited mobility, congestion due to large numbers, and
other similar factors (Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)). In practice, it is diﬃcult for workers to quit their
existing jobs and ﬁnd new suitable employers. Similarly, it is costly for ﬁrms to replace their employees.
The costs of ﬁnding new contractual partners create a bilateral monopoly situation in wage determination
so that the match-speciﬁc surplus has to be shared by bargaining. If the parameter 0 < β < 1 indicates
the bargaining power of the worker, the bargaining process generates proﬁts equal to the Nash bargaining
solution △(t) = (1 − β)f (t) (Acemoglu (1997)).
Furthermore, wage compression may arise due to the interaction of general and speciﬁc skills. If
general and speciﬁc skills are complements in the production of output, the presence of speciﬁc skills
increases the productivity of general human capital. On the other hand, the value of ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills
increases when general skills are acquired (Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b)). Kessler and Luelfesmann
(2002) as well as Balmaceda (2001) extend this idea by designing a model with general and speciﬁc skills
that constitute strategic complements although returns and costs are technologically disconnected. They
ﬁnd that there is ﬁrm-sponsored general training because the hold-up problem of investments in general
skills is reduced. According to Bougheas and Georgellis (2004), this interaction of general and speciﬁc
skills is the main reason for German ﬁrms to oﬀer apprenticeship training positions although training is
largely general.
A third source of wage compression is the presence of asymmetric information between the current
ﬁrm and other potential employers. There are two possible types of asymmetric information. The ﬁrst
concerns the amount of training the worker has received and is analyzed by Chang and Wang (1996).
If potential employers cannot observe the correct productivity and thus pay a wage below the marginal
product, the wage structure is compressed. The second possible asymmetry between the current and
potential employers is about the innate ability of the worker (hidden knowledge), i.e. the employer learns
about the ability of the worker by providing general training (Acemoglu and Pischke (1998b)).
A fourth reason for wage compression is the presence of asymmetric information between the worker
and the current employer concerning the worker’s eﬀort (hidden action). Hence, wages must satisfy the
incentive compatibility constraints which leads to a compressed wage structure (Acemoglu and Pischke
(1999b)). In a similar model, Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) demonstrate that eﬃciency wages (that
are paid to reduce ﬂuctuations) can also induce ﬁrms to pay for general training.
8Many authors have investigated similar sources of ﬁrm-sponsored general training. For example,
Bishop (1997) and Lazear (2003) point out that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc mixture of general skills makes the labor
market non-competitive. Furthermore, wage compression can also be generated by labor market institu-
tions, for example minimum wages (Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a)) and worker unionization (Freeman
and Medoﬀ (1984)).
In a nutshell, the reasons for ineﬃciently low investments in general training are summarized in
Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick (2003): (1) imperfect capital markets (i.e. the workers are credit
constrained), (2) incomplete contracts (i.e. the desired level of training cannot be speciﬁed by a contract),
(3) absence of labor market frictions (i.e. the hold-up problem), and (4) positive external eﬀects of human
capital investments for potential future employers if there is a positive probability of exogenous separation
after the training period.
3.2 Speciﬁc Human Capital
3.2.1 Investments in Speciﬁc Human Capital: Theory
According to Becker (1964), training in speciﬁc human capital is diﬀerent from general training because
workers do not beneﬁt from higher productivity after changing their jobs. Both in perfect and imperfect
labor markets, ﬁrms can recoup investments in speciﬁc skills and thus are willing to share some of the
costs of these investments (cf. table 1).
The accumulation of speciﬁc human capital leads to lower ﬂuctuations because both ﬁrms and workers
beneﬁt from keeping their contractual partner (Becker (1962)). In a search model with economic growth
and possible accumulation of speciﬁc human capital, Higashi (2002) conﬁrms that investments in speciﬁc
human capital reduce the number of quits. This result can be split into two diﬀerent eﬀects depending on
who pays for the investment. Firm-sponsored speciﬁc training reduces layoﬀ rates, while worker-ﬁnanced
speciﬁc training leads to lower quit rates (Parsons (1972)). Donaldson and Eaton (1976) stress that
ﬁrms can manipulate the workers’ wage proﬁle by investing in speciﬁc skills in order to reduce turnover.
Hence, the negative relationship between wages and labor turnover creates incentives for ﬁrm-sponsored
investments in speciﬁc human capital (Rosholm and Svarer (2004)).
According to Becker (1964), many divisions of costs and returns are possible and the optimal sharing
rule depends on the correlation between wage and turnover rate. As a corner solution, speciﬁc human
capital may be no shared investment if the ﬁrms manage to keep the whole return (Donaldson and Eaton
(1977)). In this context, Prendergast (1993) describes a dual moral hazard problem: ﬁrst, workers have
an incentive not to accumulate speciﬁc skills if it is costly for them; and second, ﬁrms have an incentive
not to reward the accumulated speciﬁc skills. As a consequence, the total amount of human capital
investment is generally ineﬃcient (cf. table 1). By interpreting investments in speciﬁc human capital
as application of the Coase theorem, Hashimoto (1981) tries to determine the sharing rule of the return
to speciﬁc training. The key feature is the existence of transaction costs while the wage is set so as to
maximize the expected total surplus.
9By using a dynamic model of wage determination in the presence of speciﬁc human capital, Felli and
Harris (1996) show that the worker receives the full value of the match with an alternative employer. More
precisely, there are three components of the wage: the worker’s expected productivity in the alternative
match, a premium reﬂecting the accumulation of human capital speciﬁc to the alternative match that
the worker forgoes by staying with the current employer, and a reduction reﬂecting the human capital
speciﬁc to the alternative match that the worker also obtains by staying with the current employer. In
a dynamic matching model, Arozamena and Centeno (2006) analyze the interaction of job tenure and
external labor market conditions in the wage setting process. As the employment relationship evolves
(and more match-speciﬁc human capital is accumulated), external labor market conditions (particularly
unemployment and real growth) exert less inﬂuence on the wage.
3.2.2 Investments in Speciﬁc Human Capital: Empirical Results
Empirically, Lynch (1991) ﬁnds that individuals with on-the-job training are less likely to leave their
current employer while individuals with oﬀ-the-job training are more likely to quit. Loewenstein and
Spletzer (1997) show that individuals with company training are less likely to quit their job, whereas
individuals with school training have mobility characteristics similar to those with no training. If on-
the-job training is more speciﬁc than oﬀ-the-job training (as presumed by Lynch (1991)) and company
training is more speciﬁc than school training (as suggested by Loewenstein and Spletzer (1997)), then the
job mobility results are in line with the theoretical predictions of the human capital model (cf. Section
3.2.1). In almost the same manner, Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999) ﬁnd that speciﬁc training and job
mobility are negatively correlated.
An empirical study for Switzerland shows that speciﬁc training reduces both job search activity
and job mobility while general training signiﬁcantly increases job search (Zweimüller and Winter-Ebmer
(2000)). Based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), Bougheas and Georgellis
(2004) ﬁnd that labor turnover is negatively correlated with tenure because ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital
is accumulated during employment.
4 The Rate of Return to Education
The rate of return to education is analyzed by two diﬀerent branches of human capital literature. Ac-
cording to the micro labor literature, the rate of return to education measures the extra earnings of a
worker for an additional year of schooling and training, while the macro growth literature investigates
whether the level of education in a cross-section of countries is related to the GDP growth rates (Krueger
and Lindahl (2001)). In the following, we focus on the micro literature because it is the rate of return to
education that determines the amount of human capital investments at the individual level.
104.1 Theoretical Approach
According to Mincer (1974), if the only costs of an additional year at school are foregone earnings and
if the eﬀected proportional income increase is constant over one’s lifetime, the logarithm of earnings is
linearly dependent on the years of schooling. This yields the following Mincerian wage equation for the
individual i:
lnWi = β0 + β1Si + β2Xi + β3 (Xi)
2 + εi (3)
Wi denotes the wage of individual i, Si represents the years of schooling, Xi is a measure of work
experience and εi is an individual disturbance term independent of β0 and Si. Work experience is included
as a quadratic term in order to capture the concavity of the earnings proﬁle. In a nutshell, the parameter
β1 can be interpreted as the rate of return to investments in education. Harmon, Hogan, and Walker
(2003) extend this original approach by including dispersion in the return to schooling and thus treating
β1 as a random coeﬃcient. However, empirically they do not ﬁnd any time trend in mean or variance so
that the deterministic Mincerian wage equation can be used quite appropriately.
4.2 Empirical Results
The Mincerian wage equation is a log-linear transformation of an exponential function and can be esti-
mated by OLS. Hence, the coeﬃcients have a semi-elasticity interpretation and measure the percentage
change in Wi for absolute variations in the independent variables. By estimating equation (3) on cross-
sectional data from the 1960 census for the US, Mincer (1974) ﬁnds that an additional year of schooling
yields a net increase of 11.5% in annual earnings.9 Subsequently, the Mincerian wage equation has been
estimated for many countries by using OLS. The results generally yield estimates of β1 between 5% and
15%, with slightly larger estimates for women than men (Psacharopoulos (1994)).
By equating discounted costs and beneﬁts, Becker (1964) estimates an internal rate of return to college
and high school education of 13% to 28%. However, Solow (1965) argues that these large estimates are not
corrected for correlations between education and ability. In order to solve this problem, Ashenfelter and
Krueger (1994) estimate the return to schooling by contrasting wage rates of twins with diﬀerent levels of
educational attainment. They ﬁnd that an additional year of schooling generates a wage increase of about
12% to 16%. In a similar manner, by analyzing a cross-section of twins, Rouse (1999) concludes that
the rate of return to education is about 10% per year of schooling. Furthermore, Arias and McMahon
(2001) estimate dynamic and expected dynamic rates of return to college and high school in the US.
They ﬁnd average returns of 13.3% in real terms or 11.7% after correcting for ability, family factors, and
measurement errors.
Empirical evidence for developed western economies suggests that the average estimate of the return
to an additional year of education ranges from 5% to 10% (Wilson (2001)). For example, for the UK
9Mincer (1974) converts his 16.2% gross increase in annual earnings to a net increase of 11.5% by factoring out increased
labor force participation associated with an increase in education. In a previous paper, Mincer (1958) uses data from the
1950 census.
11Study Estimate
Becker (1964) 13% - 28%
Mincer (1974) 11.5%
Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) 12% - 16%
Psacharopoulos (1994) 5% - 15%
Dearden (1998) 5.5% - 9.3%
Ashenfelter, Harmon, and Oosterbeek (1999) 6.6% - 9.3%
Arias and McMahon (2001) 11.7% - 13.3%
Wilson (2001) 5% - 10%
Table 2: The Rate of Return to Education
Dearden (1998) ﬁnds that the average annual return to an additional year of full-time education is 5.5%
for men and 9.3% for women. Comparisons with less-developed countries show that the rate of return
to education tends to be higher in latter countries (Acemoglu (2002)). However, at least some of these
countries show estimated returns to human capital investments of nearly the same magnitude, for example
Belarus with 10.1% (Pastore and Verashchagina (2006)). In a meta-analysis of the literature on returns to
education, Ashenfelter, Harmon, and Oosterbeek (1999) review 96 estimates from 27 studies regarding 9
diﬀerent countries. They ﬁnd that the average OLS estimate of the return to schooling is 6.6%, whereas
the average IV estimate is 9.3%.10 Even after adjusting for a possible publication bias (because the
probability of being published is higher for statistically signiﬁcant results), the average IV estimate is
8.1% and still exceeds the average OLS estimate.
In a nutshell, the most important empirical ﬁndings with respect to the rate of return to education
are summarized in table 2. In the following subsections, we refer to some important inﬂuencing factors
that may have an impact on the magnitude of the return to education.
4.2.1 The Rate of Return Depending on Type of Skill
The ﬁgures above are only averages for the population as a whole and the returns to education vary
signiﬁcantly, for example by the type of acquired skill. According to Wasmer (2006), speciﬁc human
capital yields a higher return than general human capital investments if the job-ﬁnding rate is low. By
using data from the Displaced Worker Surveys, Neal (1995) empirically investigates skills that are neither
completely general nor fully speciﬁc but rather common to ﬁrms operating in relatively homogenous
economic activities. Because industry-switchers suﬀer signiﬁcant wage losses, he suggests that wages
strongly reﬂect industry-speciﬁc human capital. In contrast to this result, Cingano (2003) estimates
returns to skills by using a special identiﬁcation strategy and concludes that there are no returns to skills
for industrial districts but high returns to ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills.
Important diﬀerences in rate of return to education have been found for diﬀerent subjects taken in
higher education. In the UK, men with chemistry or biology degrees have returns below average while
women with education, economics, accountancy or law have signiﬁcantly higher returns compared to
10IV estimates are identiﬁed by variability in schooling associated with quarter-of-birth. Individuals who are born early
in the year tend to earn less. Krueger and Lindahl (2001) discuss the validity of these instruments.
12other subjects (Blundell, Dearden, Goodman, and Reed (1997)). In a dynamic model of college and
major choice, Arcidiacono (2004) estimates the returns to diﬀerent majors in order to ﬁnd reasons for
ability sorting across majors.
Furthermore, individuals who completed schooling with some formal qualiﬁcation have signiﬁcantly
larger returns than individuals with the same amount of schooling but without any formal qualiﬁcation
(Dearden (1998)). Concerning the level of qualiﬁcation, Blundell, Dearden, Meghir, and Sianesi (1999)
report that the average annual return to an O level qualiﬁcation exceeds the average annual return to an
A level or higher education qualiﬁcation. Evidence from the US also suggests that there are decreasing
returns to successive investments in human capital, i.e. the rate of return to education declines with the
level of education (Hanoch (1967)). Early US studies as well as studies from developing countries ﬁnd
that the return to education is largest for investments in primary education (Psacharopoulos (1994)).
With respect to basic skills, Tyler (2004) estimates a model relating cognitive skills (measured by a
post-schooling math test), schooling, and earnings. He concludes that basic cognitive skills matter for
earnings of young dropouts. Increasing their basic skills by one standard deviation leads to 6.5% higher
earnings within the next three years.
Finally, Rubb (2003) investigates the eﬀects of overeducation (o), required education (r) and undere-
ducation (u) by estimating the following log-linear wage equation for individual i:11
lnWi = α + βrSir + βoSio + βuSiu + δΦi + εi (4)
with
Sio = Sia − Sir (5)
Siu = Sir − Sia (6)
Wi represents the wage of individual i, Sr is the required years of schooling, Sa describes the actual
years of schooling and Φ is a vector of other control variables including work experience. Rubb (2003)
ﬁnds that the premium for overeducation is about the same magnitude as the penalty for undereducation
but lower than the reward for required education, i.e. βr > βo ≈ |βu|. By using the same econometric
speciﬁcation, Bauer (2002) conﬁrms these results for Germany.
4.2.2 The Rate of Return Depending on Gender
In the UK, the average annual return to a ﬁrst degree in terms of hourly wages (compared to just A
levels) is in the range of 5% to 8% for men and 10% to 13% for women (Blundell, Dearden, Meghir,
and Sianesi (1999)). Studies from other countries also ﬁnd that investments in women’s education tend
11This econometric speciﬁcation is due to Verdugo and Verdugo (1989). The distinction between received level of education
and required education is made by Duncan and Hoﬀman (1981). In a matching model with ex-post wage bargaining, Charlot,
Decreuse, and Granier (2005) demonstrate that both over- and under-education may take place in equilibrium, depending
on the relationship between private and social returns to education.
13to yield higher rates of return than investments in men’s education. For example, Butcher and Case
(1994) ﬁnd higher returns for women in the US. In this context, Mincer and Opek (1982) suggest that
the restoration of human capital - after labor market interruptions associated with the depreciation of
human capital - is more eﬃcient than the accumulation of new human capital by men who stay inside
the labor market the whole time.
This gender diﬀerence in the returns to education arises because the earnings of women are consider-
ably lower than those of men (Blundell, Dearden, Meghir, and Sianesi (1999)). The gender wage gap can
be decomposed into three diﬀerent parts: gender diﬀerences in human capital accumulation, occupational
sex segregation12, and discrimination13 (as residuum) (Kanazawa (2005)). According to Winter-Ebmer
and Zweimüller (1992), occupational sex segregation can have three diﬀerent reasons: diﬀerent prefer-
ences for various occupations, crowding (i.e. disadvantages in "male jobs" leading to oversupply in the
more "female jobs"), and human capital theory. With respect to human capital theory, Blackburn (2004)
empirically ﬁnds that men perform better in math-oriented tests and women better on speed-oriented
tests. However, he argues that test score diﬀerences explain only a small part of the gender wage gap.
Another explanation for the gender wage gap my be the fertility decision of women which leads
to labor market interruptions. This gives rise to gender diﬀerences in the turnover rate and thus in
employment and wages (Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia (2002)). Polachek (1981) extends this argument
to a rationale for occupational sex segregation and suggests that women tend to choose jobs with low
penalties for intermittent employment. Although this reasoning is rejected by England (1982), Schumann,
Ahlburg, and Mahoney (1994) ﬁnd that the male-female wage diﬀerential can be partially attributed to job
characteristics. In an empirical study for apprentices in West Germany, Kunze (2005) veriﬁes a gender
wage diﬀerential of about 25% that is attributed to occupational segregation. However, Blau (1998)
suggests that the convergence in male and female college majors may be responsible for a reduction in
the gender wage gap during the 1980s.
4.2.3 The Rate of Return Depending on Time
In his empirical analysis for Thailand, Hawley (2004) ﬁnds increasing returns to education over time which
are ﬂuctuating depending on gender and the type of skill. The general trend of rising returns to human
capital in the 20th century is analyzed in a theoretical model by Acemoglu (2002). He suggests that
the increasing supply of skills leads to skill-biased technological change. As a consequence, the demand
for skills rises and thus the returns to skill and wage inequality increase. In a nutshell, the individual
returns to education change over time due to the increased interaction between demand for and supply
of workers at each qualiﬁcation level. Individuals working in an industry with rapid technological change
have above-average returns to education, which can be attributed to the positive correlation of education
and adaptability to new technologies in high-tech ﬁrms (Lillard and Tan (1992)).
12If diﬀerent occupations require diﬀerent skills and people are diﬀerently equipped with these skills, individuals have
comparative advantages for one occupation leading to self-selection into diﬀerent occupations (Paglin and Rufolo (1990)).
Another explanation for the development of comparative advantages is given by Rosen (1983).
13Bloch and Smith (1977) and Bloch and Smith (1979) ﬁnd sex discrimination much more important than race discrimi-
nation.
14According to Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), rising wage inequality stems from two dimensions
of inequality which have been growing over time: the return to education and within-group inequality.
However, Mincer (1997) suggests that (log) wages are an increasingly convex function of years of schooling,
which implies that growing wage inequality is essentially concentrated at the top of the wage distribution.
By analyzing the distribution of taxable earnings, Piketty and Saez (2003) also ﬁnd that relative wage
gains are disproportionately concentrated in the top end of the wage distribution. Lemieux (forthcoming)
and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005) show that within-group inequality has grown substantially among
college graduates but has changed little for most other groups. This unbalanced development of the
variation in wages points at a rising trend in the return to postsecondary education (Lemieux (2006)).
4.2.4 The Rate of Return Depending on Family and School Quality
Empirical research has also highlighted the importance of other factors in aﬀecting the return to education.
These factors are for example innate ability (Dearden (1998)), family income, parental education, and
the number of siblings (Butcher and Case (1994)) as well as school quality and the proximity to a college
(Card and Krueger (1992)). For example, Lam and Schoeni (1993) show that in Brazil the estimated
returns to schooling decrease by about 30% if parental schooling is added as a family background variable
to the wage equation.
Card and Krueger (1992) use state-level data to estimate the eﬀect of school quality on the return
to education for men born between 1920 and 1949. They ﬁnd that men educated in states with lower
student/teacher ratios, longer average term length, and higher-paid teachers have higher rates of return.
By using individual-level data, Altonji and Dunn (1996) estimate the eﬀect of parental education and
school quality on educational returns. In most of their speciﬁcations, having a more educated parent is
associated with a higher return to education while school expenditures per student do not have a positive
eﬀect.
In these studies, family and school eﬀects are analyzed with respect to their impact on the return
to education but they are not allowed to directly aﬀect the process of human capital formation. The
importance of this shortcoming will become more evident when contrasted with the concept of education
production functions. This stream of literature takes the opposite position and assumes that the schooling
environment directly aﬀects the decision how much education to obtain (cf. Section 5). For example,
Wilson (2001) estimates a model that allows family, neighborhood, and school characteristics to aﬀect
educational attainment both indirectly through the expected return to education and directly as inputs
into the educational production process. She ﬁnds that background characteristics predominantly work
directly and not through their impact on returns to education.
4.3 Problems of the Empirical Analysis
There are several problems in empirically estimating the true causal eﬀect of education on individual
earnings. The most discussed of them is whether higher observed earnings for better-educated workers
15are caused by their higher education or whether individuals with greater innate ability and thus higher
earning capacity choose to acquire more education. If econometric speciﬁcations omit the direct inﬂuence
of ability, the estimated return to education is biased upward, which is referred to as ability bias due to
the positive correlation of ability and education. However, even with ability as an independent variable
empirical estimates will be biased (sorting bias) because they are unable to separate the contribution
of ability from that of education (Heckman and Vytlacil (2000)). In this context, Murnane, Willet,
Duhaldeborde, and Tyler (2000) argues that at least 50% of the full return to higher achievement can be
attributed to individual ability.
A further problem with the Mincerian approach is the endogeneity of schooling. IV studies that use
exogenous variations in the schooling decision indicate that the estimated OLS values are too small, i.e.
the OLS estimates are biased downward. The magnitude of this endogeneity bias is controversial in
the literature. While Angrist and Krueger (1991) suggest a limited impact of endogeneity, Harmon and
Walker (1995) ﬁnd a rather large eﬀect.
Finally, Lindsay (1971) notes that a correct measure of returns to education would consist in the wealth
eﬀect of increased wages due to human capital investment, but not in the simple income diﬀerence. With
increasing wages leisure is substituted for hours worked (if the substitution eﬀect of labor supply is larger
than the income eﬀect), which generates an upward bias in the estimated return to education that is
positively related to the size of the investment.
4.4 Human Capital Theory versus Signaling
As shown in Section 4.2, empirical results suggest that education provides signiﬁcant wage increases
to individuals. But the positive impact of schooling on earnings could have two diﬀerent explanations:
(1) human capital theory (i.e. education as productivity-enhancing activity), and (2) signaling (i.e.
education as indication of innate ability) (Kroch and Sjoblom (1994)).14 It is important to diﬀerentiate
between these two concepts because their implications for the optimal amount of education are completely
diﬀerent.
Kroch and Sjoblom (1994) empirically compare the two competing theories by estimating earnings
equations that include both absolute (i.e. years) and relative (i.e. percentile) measures of education.
They ﬁnd that only years of schooling aﬀect earnings, which provides evidence for human capital theory.
Groot and Oosterbeek (1994) test human capital theory by distinguishing between actual and eﬀective
years of schooling with respect to the Dutch educational system. Because earnings are related negatively
to class-skipping, positively to dropout years, and neutrally to repeated years, the results of Groot and
Oosterbeek (1994) strongly support human capital theory.
Furthermore, Black and Lynch (1996) empirically analyze whether education is positively correlated
with productivity as suggested by human capital theory. They ﬁnd that a 10% increase in average edu-
cation leads to a productivity-enhancement of 8.5% in manufacturing and 12.7% in non-manufacturing,
14The concept of signaling is based on Spence (1973).
16respectively. By using international data on test scores and wages for eleven countries and two birth
cohorts, Bedard and Ferrall (2003) show that test score dispersion and wage dispersion are positively
related.
5 The Education Production Function
According to Hanushek (1971), the severest problem in educational research is the complexity of the edu-
cational process. Hence, there is considerable confusion about how empirical studies should be conducted
and interpreted (Hanushek (1979)). Unlike common assumptions concerning the production in ﬁrms, the
educational process is characterized by two special features: ﬁrst, inputs may not be converted eﬃciently
to outputs, and second, simple school expenditures may not measure accurately the amount of all inputs
(Hanushek (1996a)). There are two kinds of potential ineﬃciencies in the allocation of school resources:
the misallocation of resources between diﬀerent units (although the resources may be used eﬃciently in
each unit) and the ineﬃcient use of given resources (although they may be allocated eﬃciently) (Bishop
and Woessmann (2002)).
Many studies focus on the eﬀects of school characteristics on educational attainment within the
framework of education production functions. The educational production process is modeled as in the
theory of the ﬁrm but with a modiﬁed interpretation of economic eﬃciency (Hanushek (1986)). The
relationship between inputs and educational output is assumed to be deterministic and depends on the
technology of the education production function.
5.1 Inputs in Educational Production
The measurement of school inputs and outputs varies from study to study, but most studies measure
inputs as expenditures per student, student-teacher ratios, teacher salaries, class size, family background,
peer groups, and individual ability. For about two thirds of the studies, the output of educational
production is measured by test scores.15 The other one third focuses on quantity of schooling achieved,
such as high-school graduation or college attendance (Bishop and Woessmann (2002)).
5.1.1 The Level of Resources
The relationship between school expenditures and educational outcome reached a lot of public awareness
with the so-called Coleman Report that analyzes the equality of educational opportunities. It suggests
that resources have only little impact on educational attainment (Coleman (1966)). Subsequently, various
studies have presented mixed conclusions concerning the dependency of student achievement on public
expenditures.
15We do not address the question whether test scores are adequate for measuring educational output. Using data from
the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988, Rose (2006) suggests that, at least for women, test score gains eﬀect
both the status of employment and earnings. Also Murnane, Willet, Duhaldeborde, and Tyler (2000) ﬁnd that one standard
deviation increase in mathematics performance at the end of high school translates into 12% higher annual earnings.
17In his inﬂuential work, Hanushek (1986) reviews 147 regressions (taken from 33 separate published
studies) regarding the eﬀects of school characteristics on educational attainment. According to Hanushek,
Rivkin, and Taylor (1996), the separate studies are diﬀerent along two dimensions: the level of data
aggregation (in many studies data are aggregated at state level) and the degree of control for other
variables that potentially inﬂuence educational performance (for example family background). In a
nutshell, Hanushek (1986) compares the sign and the signiﬁcance of the estimated eﬀects of school inputs.
Due to a lack of consistent ﬁndings, he concludes that "there appears to be no strong or systematic
relationship between school expenditures and student performance", at least after variations in family
inputs are taken into account.
Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald (1994) reexamine the same studies like Hanushek (1986) but draw a
much diﬀerent conclusion by summarizing that expenditures are positively related to school outcomes.
While Hanushek (1986) uses a "vote counting" selection rule of weighting the separate studies (i.e. the
results of each regression receive one vote), Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald (1994) use a more sophisticated
method accounting for the size of the estimate, the expected correlation in the error terms from regressions
estimated over the same sample, and the potential inﬂuence of outliers.
By applying more explicitly deﬁned search criteria to the selection of relevant studies, Greenwald,
Hedges, and Laine (1996a) again conclude that educational resources are positively related to student
achievement. Hanushek (1996b) criticizes this "specialized meta-analytic approach" by pointing out
systematic distortions towards the desired conclusions. Greenwald, Hedges, and Laine (1996b) reject
this reproach by explaining their diﬀerent understanding of "statistical independence". In a further
approach, Hanushek (1997) reviews about 400 studies in order to investigate the relationship between
student performance and school resources. He ﬁnds that most estimates are not simultaneously positive
and signiﬁcant.
Unfortunately, also more recent studies are not able to resolve whether the level of resources is a
signiﬁcant determinant of educational attainment (cf. table 3). On the one hand, Wilson (2002) uses US
data to examine the impact of school expenditures on earnings. By controlling for extensive measures of
family background and neighborhood, she ﬁnds that school expenditures positively aﬀect both earnings
and returns to education. Furthermore, Winter-Ebmer and Wirz (2002) estimate that raising educational
expenditures by 1% leads to an increase in the college enrollment rate by 1%. On the other hand, by using
data from the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), Hanushek and Luque (2003)
compare the performance in diﬀerent schooling systems and diﬀerent countries. They ﬁnd evidence of
ineﬃcient input-based schooling policies, independent of the income level of the country and the resource
level of the school.
5.1.2 Class Size
In line with Greenwald, Hedges, and Laine (1996b), Krueger (2003) criticizes the conclusions of Hanushek
(1986) and proposes a diﬀerent selection rule, namely "equal weight to every study". With this method
class size becomes a signiﬁcant determinant of student achievement. Also Tennessee’s Project STAR, a
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random-assignment experiment, seems to prove empirically the performance-enhancing eﬀect of class size
reductions. However, Hanushek (1999) argues that there are several experimental features biasing upward
the estimates of Project STAR. His objections are in detail: (1) design and implementation issues, (2)
the estimated eﬀect is only valid if students are very young, (3) the estimated eﬀect is only valid for very
large reductions in class size, (4) teacher quality is much more important than class size reductions, and
(5) the costs of such class size reductions have to be considered. Furthermore, Heckman, Layne-Farrar,
and Todd (1996) ﬁnd only little empirical evidence for the connection between class size and earnings.
However, Dustmann, Rajah, and Soest (2003) draw a diﬀerent conclusion in their analysis of class
size, education, and wages. They suggest that lowering the pupil-teacher ratio (as measure for class size)
causes an increase in the wage rate. This eﬀect is generated by two channels: a direct eﬀect of reduced
class size on wages and an indirect eﬀect by increased probability of staying in school at age 16. With
respect to the analysis of diﬀerent school resources by Hanushek (1997), Hanushek, Leung, and Yilmaz
(2003) agree that class size constitutes the most validated input factor of all school resources. In an
empirical study for Italy, Brunello and Checchi (2005) analyze the dependency of educational attainment
on school quality (measured by the pupil-teacher ratio) and family background (measured by parental
education). They conclude that school quality and family background both positively aﬀect educational
achievement and constitute complements in the production of human capital.
Altogether, the empirical evidence of class size reductions is weak but generally positive (cf. table 3).
Starting from these empirical ﬁndings, Lazear (2001) develops a "disruption model" with class size as the
main determinant of educational production (cf. Section 5.1.8).
5.1.3 Institutional Incentives
Instead of additional school expenditures, Hanushek (1997) proposes institutional incentive structures
(i.e. output-based schooling policies) to recognize diﬀerences of students, teachers, and schools. In a
nutshell, Hanushek (1997) suggests three types of eﬃciency-enhancing incentive schemes: merit pay for
19teachers and schools, acceptance of private schools, and increased competition between schools (Hanushek,
Leung, and Yilmaz (2003)). In this context, Bishop and Woessmann (2002) refer to six institutional
features aﬀecting the educational production process. These are the degree of centralization of the
examination system, the degree of centralization of school organization, the degree of teacher unionization
(as measure of teachers’ inﬂuence), parental inﬂuence (for example in choosing which school their children
should attend), the degree of competition between schools, and the distribution of responsibilities between
diﬀerent administration levels.
In the empirical literature, it is controversial whether there is a diﬀerence between private and public
education on the student achievement and whether private school competition improves the outcome of
public schools. In this context, school vouchers may be an important instrument to allocate monetary
stipends so that parents can send their children to the schools (either public or private) they ﬁnd the
most suitable.
While Rouse (1998) ﬁnds substantial beneﬁts of school vouchers with respect to the Mikwaukee
voucher experiment, Witte (2000) does not. Furthermore, Evans and Schwab (1995) conclude that private
schools outperform public schools, but Goldhaber (1996) does not conﬁrm this empirical result. In their
empirical analysis concerning undergraduate students at Ball State University, Horowitz and Spector
(2005) suggest that religious private schools perform slightly better than others, but this inﬂuence is
small and seems to disappear in later years. By evaluating the eﬀectiveness of private education across
countries with data from the PISA 2000 study, Vandenberghe and Robin (2004) conclude that private
education does not generate systematic beneﬁts.
Finally, Hoxby (2002b) suggests that private school competition leads to a better performance of
public schools, but Arum (1996) argues that this result may be only due to increased funding for public
schools rather than due to the competition itself. Hence, while competition among schools seems to have
a positive eﬀect of educational production, the empirical evidence concerning the promotion of private
schools is mixed (cf. table 3).
5.1.4 Teacher Quality and Incentives
According to Hanushek (1989), diﬀerences in school quality are generated by "teacher skills" that are not
strongly related to teacher education, teaching experience, and class size.16 By using student-level data,
Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (1998) suggest that at least 7.5% of the total variation in student achievement
can be explained by teacher ﬁxed eﬀects. Hence, educational reforms should focus on improving the
quality of the teacher force (cf. table 3). This requires a new set of incentives by introducing selective
hiring, retention, and pay (Hanushek (2006)).
Teachers in public schools face weak performance incentives because tenure is granted and the wage
is generally independent from eﬀort and outcome. Ballou and Podgursky (1998) and Ballou (1999) inves-
tigate the causes and consequences of weak incentives among public school teachers. Relative to public
16These teacher skills "cannot be described correctly, but possibly can be observed directly" (Hanushek (1986)).
20schools, private schools adopt hiring and pay practices which favor teachers with better overall academic
ability. Hence, school vouchers and competition between public and private schools may generate changes
in hiring and pay practices that attract more talented individuals into the teaching profession (Hoxby
(2002a)).
In a nutshell, it not only the teacher quality but also the teacher incentives that signiﬁcantly aﬀect
the educational outcome. For this reason, Hanushek (1989) and Hanushek (1997) propose merit pay for
teachers and schools in order to provide better institutional incentive structures. In this context, the role
of economic incentives at universities is empirically analyzed by Lach and Schankerman (2003). They
ﬁnd that increasing the share of license royalties received by academic inventors (i.e. the share not passed
on the general university budget) enhances research activity by two channels, namely by increasing the
research eﬀort and by sorting (i.e. attraction of better researchers). This eﬀect is much stronger for
private universities.
In general, Lazear (2000) analyzes existing compensation schemes that are either input-based, output-
based, or a combination of them and can be summarized by the following pay structure:
wi = αqi + β {qi > qmin} + γei + δ{ei > emin} (7)
wi represents the wage of teacher i, qi is a measure of output and ei describes the teacher’s eﬀort.
β and δ are dummies equal to one if a certain minimum output qmin or a minimum eﬀort emin are
exceeded, respectively. In a nutshell, α and β are parameters related to an output-based compensation
scheme, while γ and δ are related to an input-oriented pay structure. Furthermore, the dummies represent
compensation in discrete steps, while α and γ stand for continuously paid wages.
If α is the only parameter diﬀerent from zero, then the pay structure is said to produce "high-
powered incentives". Concerning merit pay for teachers, the optimal compensation scheme depends
on the observability of output and the heterogeneity of teachers (Lazear (1986)). Compared to input-
based wages, output-based compensation schemes lead to strong sorting of teachers according to their
productivity (Lazear (2000)).
5.1.5 Early Education
Ritzen and Winkler (1977) and Psacharopoulos (1994) propose to promote very young and high-ability
children because their returns to education exceed those of older and less able students, respectively.
According to Heckman and Masterov (2004), the main mechanisms through which early education aﬀects
productivity is through its impact on cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Furthermore, the impact of peer
abilities appears to be large for the skill development of very young children in preschool (Henry and
Rickman (forthcoming)).
Early education may be more eﬀective than oﬀering costly training for those experiencing diﬃculties
graduating from high school (Heckman (2000)). This result is empirically conﬁrmed by Temple and
Reynolds (forthcoming) who show that there are consistently positive economic returns of preschool
21programs that exceed most other educational interventions, especially later programs such as class size
reductions and youth job training (cf. table 3).17
5.1.6 Family Background and Neighborhood Eﬀects
Haveman and Wolfe (1995) provide an overview of empirical estimates concerning the inﬂuence of family
and neighborhood variables. The strong eﬀect of parental education on children’s educational success
stands out in this research. The economic status of the family (measured by total family income) also
tends to be positively correlated with educational attainment. For example, by estimating the inﬂuence
of maternal education on the human capital of their children, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) ﬁnd that
each additional year of schooling increases the children’s test scores signiﬁcantly by 2.4%. Furthermore,
Loury (2006) suggests that also older extended family members (i.e. aunts, uncles, and grandparents)
independently aﬀect the schooling of same-gender children.
Concerning the students’ choice of alternative programs of study during high school, Zietz and Joshi
(2005) suggest that family background and peer pressure constitute the most important determinants of
the program choice. Students from families with higher level of education and higher income are more
likely to pursue the college program. According to Astone and McLanahan (1991), growing up in an
intact family is associated with substantially higher educational achievement. Hanushek (1992) ﬁnds
that family size negatively aﬀects educational outcome. He attributes this eﬀect to the parental trade-oﬀ
between number of children and their schooling performance.
As shown in table 3, neighborhood eﬀects tend to be small relative to the inﬂuence of parental edu-
cation. Nevertheless, the estimated eﬀects are often statistically signiﬁcant, even when controlling for an
extensive number of family characteristics. For example, Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, Klebanov, and Sealand
(1993) estimate that the fraction of families with high and low incomes aﬀect educational attainment.
Furthermore, Datcher (1982) uses ZIP code-level data and concludes that the racial composition of the
neighborhood is not signiﬁcantly correlated with educational attainment. In a similar setup, Corcoran,
Gordon, Laren, and Solon (1992) ﬁnd that living in a neighborhood with more mother-only families
and more people on public assistance reduces educational attainment, but that median income and male
unemployment do not have signiﬁcant eﬀects.
5.1.7 Peer Eﬀects
Peer eﬀects describe the external eﬀects by some students to others. According to Epple and Romano
(1998), peer eﬀects can be deﬁned as the inﬂuence of students’ mean ability on school quality. Hoxby
(2000) concretizes this expression by specifying knowledge spillover, inﬂuence on classroom standard, and
individual behavior (i.e. self-discipline and disruption). Most empirical studies focus on socioeconomic
status indicators of peer quality, such as average income or the percentage of people with college gradu-
ation. Some studies also concentrate on the composition of peer groups, for example the proportion of
17However, the estimated eﬀects on early human capital formation may be only short-lived as suggested by DeCicca
(forthcoming) in his empirical analysis of full-day kindergarten.
22diﬀerent ethnic groups. In this context, the Coleman report concludes that peer eﬀects in public schools
contribute to diﬀerences in the educational achievement of black and white students (Coleman (1966)).
According to Manski (1993) and Rivkin (2001), there are three problems in estimating peer eﬀects:
(1) endogeneity (i.e. self-selection due to family income or educational preferences), (2) the simultaneous
interaction of students’ mutual inﬂuence, and (3) the diﬃculty to distinguish between peer eﬀects by
individual background and peer eﬀects by individual behavior. A number of studies attempts to solve
the endogeneity problem, but so far no clear consensus exists regarding its severity.
Evans, Oates, and Schwab (1992) ﬁnd that there are no peer eﬀects once endogeneity is controlled for
by estimating simultaneous equations. By using ﬁxed-eﬀects models that rely on peer variation between
siblings and controlling for parental characteristics, Aaronson (1998) ﬁnd signiﬁcant peer eﬀects while
Plotnick and Hoﬀman (1999) do not. In order to solve the problem of self-selection, Sacerdote (2001)
uses a sample of the Dartmouth College with random assignment of roommates. He ﬁnds that - at room
level as well as at dormitory level - peers indeed exert signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the Grade Point Average
(GPA). In contrast, Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2005) investigate the eﬀect of peer groups with respect
to a non-random category of students, namely medical students who graduated from US medical schools
between 1996 and 1998. They ﬁnd that the peer eﬀects disappear if school ﬁxed eﬀects are included in
order to control for endogeneity.
Hoxby (2000) uses some idiosyncratic variation of students in order to estimate peer eﬀects with an
endogeneity bias as small as possible. She concludes that augmenting the reading scores of the peer
group by one point leads to an increase in the individual test score by about 0.15 to 0.4 points. Another
approach is pursued by Lefgren (2004) who compares the academic achievement of high-ability students
in segregated and integrated schools. He ﬁnds that peer eﬀects are small but generally positive and
signiﬁcant.
By taking data from the PISA 2000 study, Fertig (2003) analyzes the inﬂuence of achievement hetero-
geneity in a peer group (measured by the variation coeﬃcient) on the individual educational attainment.
In order to circumvent the endogeneity problem, he uses an IV approach to estimate the following equa-
tion:18







′zs + εi (8)
zi is a vector of individual characteristics,   z
−i
j is a vector of the corresponding peer group charac-
teristics, C
−i
j represents the variation coeﬃcient, zs is a vector of school characteristics, and εi is an
unobserved error term. In this context, γ measures the endogenous part of the peer eﬀect (i.e. the direct
impact of group achievement), while δ describes the exogenous or contextual eﬀects (i.e. the indirect
impact of other peer characteristics, for example group composition).
In a nutshell, Fertig (2003) obtains the following empirical result: the higher the heterogeneity of the
18The variation coeﬃcient is deﬁned as standard deviation devided by mean.
PISA is the abbreviation for "Program for International Student Assessment". The PISA 2000 data contain test scores in
reading, mathematics, and science literacy of representative samples of 15-year old students across OECD and non-OECD
countries. Furthermore, they provide a rich set of background information about students and schools. For the empirical
analysis on hand, Fertig (2003) only uses the reading scores for US students.
23peer group, the lower is individual educational outcome. As a consequence, the aggregate educational
output should be maximized if schools exhibit perfect homogeneity of students. However, Fertig (2003)
admits that the explanatory power of the endogenous variable declines substantially when exogenous
eﬀects are controlled for.
5.1.8 Segregation
As illustrated in the previous subsection, the presence of peer eﬀects gives rise to the idea of an eﬃcient
sorting of students according to their innate ability (Epple and Romano (1998)). In general, there are two
possibilities of putting together students with diﬀerent individual abilities: integration (i.e. randomized
mixing) and segregation (i.e. sorting according to the students’ abilities).
Segregation implies that classes are completely homogenous and theoretically, the individual devi-
ation from mean ability is zero. For example, the educational system of Germany is one of the most
segregated among industrialized countries. Depending on the student’s ability, there are four types of
German secondary schools: lower (Hauptschule), middle (Realschule), upper (Gymnasium), and mixed
(Gesamtschule) (Cooke (2003)).
Lazear (2001) makes an important attempt to analyze the eﬀects of segregation in a model based on
microeconomic considerations. In his "disruption model", mj represents class size (i.e. the number of
students in class j) and p is the probability that a student behaves so that lessons can be given without
disruption. The total amount of learning (Lj) in class j is deﬁned by the following education production
function:
Lj (mj,p) = mjpmj (9)
If there are diﬀerent ability-types of students with diﬀerent disruption probabilities, the aggregate
educational output is generally larger with segregation than with integration. Hence, in line with Fertig
(2003), the aggregate educational output is maximized if schools exhibit perfect homogeneity of stu-
dents. However, Lazear (2001) also refers to one important exception from this conclusion: if students
with low-ability can be transformed into high-ability students by undergoing social contact with these
better behaving students, then mixed classes may yield higher educational outcomes than segregation.
Altogether, the eﬀect of segregation on the educational achievement of students is ambiguous (cf. table
3).
5.2 Models of Educational Production
Nechyba (1996) incorporates peer eﬀects into the following education production function that describes
the educational achievement (yij) of individual i in peer group j:
yij = (  yj)
ρ (ej)
1−ρ (10)
24with ρ measuring the strength of the peer eﬀect. In this production function, ej describes the expen-
ditures per student in group j, and   yj is the average educational outcome of peer group j.
If the educational system allows for private schools in combination with private school vouchers,
then there is endogenous ability-based segregation so that each private school is completely homogenous
in ability. This is shown by Nechyba (1996) who undertakes general-equilibrium simulations within the
framework of his education production function (10). In a theoretical model with public schools (ﬁnanced
by taxes and without tuition) and private schools (completely ﬁnanced by tuition), Epple and Romano
(1998) draw a similar conclusion. They demonstrate that there is a strict hierarchy of school qualities and
a two-dimensional student sorting according to ability and income. Quite intuitively, the implementation
of tuition vouchers beneﬁts high-ability students relative to students with low ability.
Caucutt (2002) expands on Nechyba (1996) by considering diﬀerent ability levels θk (with nkj as the










Based on this education production function (11), Caucutt (2001) and Caucutt (2002) develop a
general-equilibrium model (with schools interpreted as clubs) where the change from a public school
system (with endogenous number of private schools) to a completely private system of schools with
vouchers yields several mixed schools with sorting according to ability and tuition fees.
6 Human Capital and the Life-Cycle of Earnings
6.1 The Accumulation of Human Capital over the Life-Cycle
An important stream of human capital literature deals with the life-cycle of earnings. Mincer (1958)
points out that the diﬀerence between normally distributed abilities and the positively skewed distribu-
tion of incomes must be due to investments in human capital over the life-cycle.19 Becker (1964) suggests
that earnings increase with age but at a declining rate. In a nutshell, Mincer (1970) and Mincer (1997)
summarize the empirical evidence concerning the age-earnings proﬁle of individuals. Earnings (Et) posi-
tively depend on the stock of human capital (Ht) at date t; the age-earnings proﬁle is concave and at least
for a long time upward-sloping. If human capital investment increases, the age-earnings proﬁle becomes
steeper and has its maximum later. These empirical ﬁndings are illustrated in ﬁgure 2.
Becker (1962) notes that human capital investment decreases with age. Intuitively, this is because
younger workers receive the returns to education over a longer period and the investment risk increases
with age (which implies that older workers discount future earnings more heavily) (Zucker (1967)). In a
nutshell, decreasing marginal returns and increasing marginal costs lead to an optimal amount of human
19The normal distribution of abilities is also assumed by Becker (1964).
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Figure 2: Human Capital and the Life-Cycle of Earnings
capital investment that negatively depends on age (Mincer (1970)). However, human capital investment
may not monotonically decline with age if the accumulated human capital is rather speciﬁc than general.
While the proﬁtability of general skills depends on the length of working life, the proﬁtability of speciﬁc
skills only depends on the expected duration of the current job (Bartel and Borjas (1977)).
Models of (general) human capital accumulation over the life-cycle can be attributed to two diﬀerent
branches: earnings maximizing models and utility maximizing models. Earnings maximizing models
abstract from the labor-leisure choice problem and only analyze the trade-oﬀ between investment and
income. At the intensive margin, the individual faces a trade-oﬀ between producing additional human
capital and renting his existing stock of human capital in the labor market. Utility maximizing models
also incorporate the labor-leisure choice so that labor supply becomes endogenous to the model. The
diﬀerence between these two types of models is illustrated by Snow and Warren (1990) who explain that
the income eﬀect of higher wages (due to investments in human capital) on future labor supply may
reduce realized future earnings. However, there are eﬀorts to integrate these two branches, for example
by Blinder and Weiss (1976). Weiss (1986) provides a review of the theoretical literature.
Ben-Porath (1967) develops an earnings maximizing model of human capital accumulation and gives
a productivity-based explanation of earnings growing with age. He emphasizes the process by which
additions to the individual stock of human capital are produced. The model is similar to Becker (1964)
in the sense that each individual is presumed to combine market goods (Dt) with some portion (st) of
his own human capital (Ht) to produce new human capital (Qt) in period t according to the following
production function:
Qt = f (st,Ht,Dt) = β0 (stHt)
β1 (Dt)
β2 (12)
The rate of change of the stock of human capital is equal to
˙ Ht = Qt − σHt (13)
26where σ represents the depreciation rate of human capital. The individual maximizes the sum of all future
disposable earnings discounted over the life-cycle. The individual decision problem consists in choosing
that portion of the existing stock of human capital to be used as input in the production of further human
capital. This choice is made by comparing the costs of producing an additional unit of human capital
to the marginal beneﬁts. The whole decision problem can be divided into two separate parts: ﬁrst, the
trade-oﬀ between income and human capital formation, and second, the timing of consumption.
Heckman (1976) designs a utility maximizing model with endogenous labor supply, income, human
capital accumulation, consumption, and non-monetary utility of education, which contains the original
model of Ben-Porath (1967) as a special case. Human capital accumulation takes place according to the
following relationship:
˙ Ht = f (ItHt,Dt) − σHt (14)
Ht represents the stock of human capital at date t, It is the time devoted to human capital production,
Dt stands for the direct costs, and σ is the depreciation rate of human capital.
Even the basic model by Ben-Porath (1967) manages to replicate the most important qualitative char-
acteristics of the empirical life-cycle patterns. According to Ben-Porath (1967), there are three diﬀerent
phases of human capital accumulation: an initial phase with no earnings (i.e. full-time human capital
production, interpreted as "formal schooling"), a long phase with part-time human capital production,
and a third phase with no training.20 The second phase is characterized by earnings increasing at a
declining rate (and eventually decreasing). At any point in time, individuals with more schooling or
greater ability invest more in on-the-job training.
A serious problem of the empirical application of human capital theory to life-cycle diﬀerences in
earnings is that post-school investments are not directly observable. As a consequence, measurement
problems arise because a wide range of activities might be viewed as on-the-job training (Hanushek and
Quigley (1985)). By using data from the NLLS, Haley (1976) empirically estimates the model by Ben-
Porath (1967) and concludes that it ﬁts the data quite well. In contrast, Brown (1976) ﬁnds only a poor
performance of the model. However, Heckman (1976) ﬁnds that his model ﬁts the data well and even
better than Ben-Porath (1967).
The hypothesis that earnings proﬁles are driven by human capital investment is further analyzed
by Mincer (1997). For the US, he conﬁrms that post-school investment in human capital is indeed the
primary factor underlying the wage proﬁles. He also ﬁnds empirical support for the implications by Ben-
Porath (1967) concerning the positive relationship between ability, schooling, and on-the-job training.
Besides this vast literature on life-cycle human capital investment, there is a strand of literature
concentrating on the extensive margin. The extensive education decision divides the workforce into dif-
ferent skill groups such as low-skilled and high-skilled workers. This mostly empirical literature analyzes
self-selection of students into skill groups according to ability types which aﬀects estimates of occupa-
tional choice and thus the distribution of earnings.21 For example, Willis and Rosen (1979) as well as
20Wallace and Ihnen (1975) develop a model to describe endogenously the "formal schooling" period and the end of this
phase depending on the parameters of the model. They suggest a longer "formal schooling" period than Ben-Porath (1967).
21The ﬁrst source is Roy (1951), which has received subsequent elaboration, for example by Heckman and Honoré (1990).
27Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998a) derive a theoretical model of the demand for college attendance
and empirically show that expected lifetime earnings diﬀerentials indeed inﬂuence the college attendance
choice.
6.2 Implications of Pension Systems for Human Capital Formation
According to Echevarría (2003), the return to human capital investments is aﬀected by the pension
system if ﬁnite horizon economies are considered. With a tax-beneﬁt link, the return to education is not
restricted to increased labor incomes, but also extends to pensions during retirement. Hence, if workers
decide on the optimal amount of human capital investments, they take into account not only the eﬀect
on future labor incomes but also on future retirement beneﬁts (Echevarría and Iza (2005)).
Lau and Poutvaara (2001a) and Lau and Poutvaara (2001b) study the impact of social security
incentives on human capital formation, arguing that actuarial fairness and a tight tax-beneﬁt link increase
human capital along with an increase in the retirement age. This is a common result in most theoretical
analyses because postponed retirement lengthens the time period at the extensive margin over which
individuals can appropriate the beneﬁts from human capital investments, which translates into higher
returns to education (Trostel (1993)). Hence, the return to education positively depends on the remaining
active years. In a nutshell, postponed retirement raises aggregate human capital because higher returns
to education are associated with increased human capital investments (Echevarría (2003)).
In their analysis of demographic transition and economic growth, Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil
(2000) show in an OLG framework that augmented life expectancy gives rise to increased human capital
formation. In a similar setup, de la Croix and Licandro (1999) investigate an economy where the workers
accumulate human capital as a function of their optimal schooling period. The eﬀect of lower mortality
rates on human capital formation is positive because the increased expected ﬂow of future incomes will
increase human capital per capita. The same result is obtained by Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro
(2002) under a setting with uncertain lifetime horizon and endogenous retirement age. Echevarría (2003)
argues that an increase in life expectancy translates into higher growth rates by increased human capital
formation only if demographic change is accompanied by simultaneous increments in the length of the
working life. Hence, if there is a positive correlation between life expectancy and retirement age, an
increase in life expectancy will foster the formation of human capital. For the UK, this result is empirically
conﬁrmed by Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil (2000).
In a nutshell, because the PAYG pension system generates distortions in labor supply and thus
provides incentives for early retirement, aggregate human capital is lower than with a capital funded
system of old-age provision. The reason is that the PAYG system discourages human capital formation
both directly and indirectly via the retirement age (Echevarría and Iza (2005)). Moving the pension
system from PAYG towards capital funding eliminates the distortions in the labor market and thus
increases the workers’ retirement age and the investment in human capital (Feldstein (2005)).
Furthermore, the positive relationship between retirement age and human capital accumulation also
holds in the opposite direction. According to Hernoes, Sollie, and Strom (2000), education is an important
28determinant of the retirement age. A higher stock of human capital increases the retirement age because
the worker’s higher productivity implies increased labor incomes and makes labor supply more worthwhile
compared to retirement. Hence, while early retirement is low among high-skilled workers, low-skilled
workers may take the opportunity to retire at the lowest possible date.
7 Fiscal Policy and Human Capital Formation
Weisbrod (1966) assigns to the government the role of using its limited resources for the economic well-
being of its people. Hence, it is important to investigate tax and expenditure issues in an integrated analy-
sis because they constitute "Siamese twins" concerning the maximization of aggregate welfare (Bovenberg
and Jacobs (2005)). For example, with respect to the optimal level of education subsidies, social welfare
is maximized subject to the public budget constraint (Steuerle (1996)).
However, the design of tax and education policies must also consider the special characteristics of
human capital (Anderberg and Andersson (2003)). In this context, Eaton and Rosen (1980) suggest
that the eﬃcient tax rate may be greater than zero in order to provide insurance against the riskiness of
human capital investments.
7.1 The Eﬀects of Taxation on Human Capital Formation
An ideal income tax should deﬁne income uniformly as the sum of earnings from all possible sources.
Hence, human capital should be taxed like physical or ﬁnancial assets (Kaplow (1994)). Theoretically,
this implies that human capital should be taxed in three ways: at birth (i.e. the present value of expected
future earnings net of costs should be taxed immediately), over time (reﬂecting the diﬀerence between
earnings and depreciation of human capital), and at all moments when uncertainty is resolved (Kaplow
(1996)).
Because the ideal income tax is not feasible in reality, we analyze the eﬀects of taxing labor and
capital income within a prevalent ﬁscal system. Due to the special characteristics of human capital there
are great diﬀerences in the taxation of human and physical capital, which leads to radically diﬀerent tax
burdens (Ill (1984)). In the context of his life-cycle model, Heckman (1976) shows that diﬀerences in the
tax treatment of human and physical capital may induce the substitution of human capital for physical
capital investment.
In the absence of direct costs of education, there is no direct eﬀect of a proportional income tax on
the accumulation of human capital because both marginal returns and marginal costs are scaled down
in the same proportion. With direct costs of education, an increase in the tax rate decreases human
capital investment if the net ﬁnancial beneﬁt before taxes is positive (Heckman, Lochner, and Taber
(1999a)). In a nutshell, the marginal eﬀects of proportional income taxation on human capital formation
may be signiﬁcantly negative for three reasons. First, some direct inputs into the process of human
capital production are not tax-deductible (in contrast to foregone earnings). Second, the negative eﬀect
29of taxation on labor supply reduces the return to education. And ﬁnally, the negative eﬀect of taxation
on savings reduces the amount of physical capital and thus - by general-equilibrium eﬀects on interest
rates and wages - human capital investments (Trostel (1993)).
A progressive income tax strengthens the negative eﬀects of taxation on human capital formation of
workers because marginal returns on future earnings are reduced more than marginal costs of schooling by
foregone earnings (Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1999a)). However, higher tax progression my increase
the ﬁrms’ investments in human capital if the degree of tax progression changes the distribution of the
surplus between the worker and the ﬁrm and thus increases the compression of the wage structure (cf.
Section 3.1.2). Hence, if labor markets are imperfect and both the worker and the ﬁrm can invest in
human capital, higher tax progression increases human capital formation if the positive eﬀect on the
ﬁrms outweighs the negative eﬀect on the workers (Hungerbühler (forthcoming)). Furthermore, the
progressivity of the tax system aﬀects the job mobility of workers. On-the-job search (i.e. the probability
of turnover) decreases both with the level of tax rates and with the convexity of the tax system (as
measure of progressivity) (Gentry and Hubbard (2002)).
If there is only unskilled labor and physical capital, a "comprehensive income tax" (i.e. the same
taxation of labor and capital income) generates two distortionary eﬀects on resource allocation, namely
on the intratemporal leisure-consumption trade-oﬀ (due to the taxation of labor) and on the intertemporal
saving-consumption trade-oﬀ (due to the taxation of capital). However, in the presence of skilled labor and
human capital, the "comprehensive income tax" generates two additional distortions. On the one hand,
it discriminates against physical capital because the capital income tax does not apply to investments in
human capital. On the other hand, it discriminates against human capital because the labor income tax
reduces the return to education. While the net eﬀect of these two distortions is ambiguous in general,
the "comprehensive income tax" discriminates against human capital if there are only direct costs of
education and the government does not use the tax revenues to subsidize the human capital formation
(Nerlove, Razin, Sadka, and Weizsäcker (1993)).
In contrast, if the only costs of education are foregone earnings, Nielsen and Sorensen (1997) suggest
that the "comprehensive income tax" leads to a discrimination against investments in physical capital.
Hence, they propose a "dual income tax"22 (i.e. the combination of a proportional tax on capital income
with a progressive tax on labor income) on pure eﬃciency grounds (and not on the basis of redistribution
or insurance arguments) because the progressivity of the labor income tax reduces the return to education.
7.2 The Eﬀects of Tax Reforms on Human Capital Formation
The ﬁrst attempt to quantify the importance of human capital formation for the comparative eﬃciency
costs of alternative tax bases is due to Driﬃll and Rosen (1983). In a partial-equilibrium life-cycle model,
they conclude that income taxation according to the "comprehensive income tax" can be dramatically
more distortionary than the taxation of consumption. As suggested by Perroni (1995), switching from
22Nielsen and Sorensen (1997) refer to it as the "Nordic system of dual income taxation" because it was implemented in
all four Nordic countries.
30income to revenue-neutral consumption taxation provides large welfare gains. In this context, endogenous
human capital has only little eﬀects because the substitutability between labor supply and human capital
is limited by downward rigidities in the stock of human capital (i.e. the stock of human capital can
decrease at most with its rate of depreciation). However, Judd (1998) shows that consumption taxes are
generally biased against investment in human capital.
There are several approaches to analyze the welfare consequences of alternative tax policies in a
general-equilibrium framework with endogenous human capital formation. Starting point of various
numerical simulations is the current US tax system approximated by a proportional tax on capital income
and a progressive tax on labor income (Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1999b)). In a general-equilibrium
growth model with OLG and perfect foresight, Perroni (1995) shows that the welfare gains from switching
to a revenue-neutral consumption tax are much lower than in a partial-equilibrium setting because prices
adjust in response to quantities.
Furthermore, in an OLG dynamic general-equilibrium model with endogenous human capital forma-
tion and heterogenous agents, Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998b) investigate the consequences of two
revenue-neutral tax reforms, namely a ﬂat income tax (i.e. a proportional tax on both labor and capital
income) and a ﬂat consumption tax. Analytically, each individual solves a two-step decision problem:
ﬁrst, he determines the optimal paths of consumption and post-school human capital investment con-
ditional on the level of schooling, and second, he chooses that level of schooling which maximizes his
aggregate welfare over the life-cycle (Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998b)). In a nutshell, switching to
a ﬂat income tax fosters the accumulation of human capital at the cost of reduced investment in physical
capital, while a ﬂat consumption tax is more pro-capital and less favorable to human capital. Similar to
Perroni (1995), general-equilibrium eﬀects of these tax reforms are much weaker than partial-equilibrium
eﬀects (Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1999b)).
7.3 The Eﬀects of Education Subsidies on Human Capital Formation
According to Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), optimal education subsidies can increase eﬃciency in human
capital formation by oﬀsetting tax-induced distortions. For example, with respect to the negative eﬀects
of taxation on human capital formation by workers (cf. Section 7.1), education subsidies can correct for
the hold-up problem in imperfect labor markets (Boone and de Mooij (2003)).
Collins and Davies (2003) conclude that the incentives for human capital accumulation depend on the
net eﬀective tax rate (NETR), i.e. the diﬀerence between the eﬀective tax rate (ETR) and the eﬀective
subsidy rate (ESR). This concept is based on the internal rate of return that is determined by comparing
the sum of discounted earnings with and without taxation and subsidies, respectively:









31ETR, ESR and NETR are calculated by considering the relationship between the gross rate of return
(rg), the net rate of return (rn), and the public rate of return (rp). In their empirical analysis for Canada,
Collins and Davies (2003) ﬁnd that the net eﬀective tax rate is smaller than zero.
In a nutshell, Dur and Teulings (2003) favor the implementation of education subsidies for three
reasons: (1) redistribution, (2) positive externalities of education, and (3) credit constraints due to capital
market imperfections.23 However, positive external eﬀects of higher education are diﬃcult to establish
empirically (for example Krueger and Lindahl (2002)) and also the empirical ﬁndings with respect to
capital market imperfections are controversial in the literature (for example Shea (2000)).
As a further argument for education subsidies, Bénabou (2002) points out the insurance eﬀect because
subsidies to higher education make college attendance more attractive by reducing both the direct costs
and the risk, particularly for students with low wealth endowment. If investments in human capital
are risky and uninsurable, even small initial changes in college investment may generate large changes
in college attendance (Ljungqvist (1995)). In a theoretical model, Akyol and Athreya (2005) suggest
large welfare gains of education subsidies relative to the fully decentralized outcome because subsidies
lead to nearly mean preserving reductions in college failure risk. Furthermore, if the variance of wages
decreases with the level of education, education per se produces an insurance eﬀect (Anderberg and
Andersson (2003)). In this context, Bénabou (2002) develops a risk-adjusted, distribution-free measure
of general eﬃciency. By simulating his model with empirical parameter estimates, he shows that the
optimal education subsidy should be combined with a tax on consumption.
However, education subsidies also lead to adverse selection (i.e. more low-ability students attend
college) and may generate a deadweight loss if they are ﬁnanced by distortionary taxation. Hence, the
optimal level of education subsidies has to maximize social welfare subject to this trade-oﬀ (Dur and
Teulings (2003)).
7.4 Fiscal Policy in the Context of Factor Mobility
According to Boadway (1996), mandatory education and the public provision of education can be ex-
plained as second-best policies in order to circumvent the hold-up problem of time-consistent optimal
taxation, i.e. the problem of underinvestment in human capital because workers anticipate the excessive
taxation of their labor incomes in the future. However, globalization and increased mobility of high-skilled
workers reduce this time-consistency problem because the government’s ex post incentives to tax human
capital are decreased.
The eﬀects of proceeding globalization on taxation and education policy are analyzed by Andersson
and Konrad (2001) and Andersson and Konrad (2003). Compared to the closed-economy benchmark
case, globalization increases the aggregate welfare if optimal education subsidies are completely directed
to immobile low-skilled workers (Andersson and Konrad (2001)).
23Capital market imperfections imply that workers may be prevented from investing eﬃciently in their stock of (general)
human capital (cf. Section 3.1).
32However, in the presence of "Leviathan governments", the full mobility of high-skilled workers gener-
ates welfare losses because the tax competing governments raises taxes on education in order to broaden
their tax base which only comprises the immobile low-skilled workers (Andersson and Konrad (2003)).
With respect time-consistent optimal taxation, Konrad (2001) suggests another solution to the problem
of underinvestment in human capital. If the government has only limited information about the eﬀort
of workers, then this may work as Pareto-improving commitment mechanism to time-consistent taxation
and thus reduces the hold-up problem.
In a similar model with education subsidies ﬁnanced by labor income taxation and possible migration
of high-skilled workers, Poutvaara (2001) analyzes the eﬀects of tax competition between countries in a
federation. He concludes that this tax competition may lead to ineﬃciently low taxes and subsidies. In
a nutshell, the problem of underinvestment in human capital can be solved by a ﬁscal system such that
taxes are paid to the country of education and not to the country of residence.
8 Conclusion
The contribution of this paper is to provide a better understanding of the process of human capital
formation and educational attainment. Furthermore, we analyze policy instruments and institutional
features that may help to increase the aggregate welfare by improving the eﬃciency of the educational
system. Although this literature review does not provide a ﬁnal word on incentive schemes in the process
of educational production, it points out some important issues of human capital formation that may
shape future research and policy discussions.
In order to structure the vast literature on human capital formation, the review is divided into six
parts. Historically, there have been two diﬀerent ways of conceptualizing educational attainment. First,
human capital theory models individuals as investing in human capital in response to the expected returns
to education. A second branch of literature focuses on the empirical eﬀects of school characteristics on
educational attainment. These studies model education production functions where the educational
output is determined as a function of production technology and the amount of inputs. These two
concepts of educational attainment - including theoretical analyses as well as empirical estimates - are
presented in Sections 2 and 5 of this paper.
According to Haley (1973), human capital theory is further divided into literature estimating the
rate of return to education (cf. Section 4) and a second stream of literature modeling the life-cycle of
earnings with endogenous accumulation of human capital (cf. Section 6). The third section of this review
refers to the distinction between general and speciﬁc human capital and the diﬀerent implications for
human capital formation. In Section 7, we analyze the eﬀects of taxation and education subsidies on the
accumulation of human capital.
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